The need for national development strategies
Economic development requires a national development strategy. Historically, countries that were successful in developing and in catching up adopted national development or national competition strategies. What is a national development strategy? It is a set of economic development-oriented values, ideas, laws and policies conducive to the creation of opportunities for risk-taking entrepreneurs to invest and innovate. The key institution or cluster of institutions behind economic growth is not the guarantee of property rights and contracts, as the new institutionalists suggest, but a national development strategy.
2 It is less than a national development project or plan because it is not formal; it lacks a document that accurately describes objectives or the policies to be implemented in order to attain such objectives, because the inherent accord among the social classes has neither text nor signatures. And it is more than a national development project or plan because it informally embraces the whole of society or a large share thereof; it illuminates for all a path to tread and sets out certain very general guidelines to be observed; and, although it does not assume a conflict-free society, it does require a reasonable consensus when it comes to competing internationally. It is more flexible than a project, and it always considers the actions of opponents or competitors. It recognizes that the factor that drives individual behavior is not just personal interest but competition with other nations. A national development strategy reflects all of this. Its leadership falls to the government and the more active elements of civil society. Its fundamental instrument is the state itself: its norms, policies and organization. Its outcome, when a major accord establishes itself, when strategy becomes truly national, when society begins sharing, loosely but effectively, methods and goals, is accelerated development -a period during which the country enjoys high per capita income and high growth rates of living standards.
A national development strategy implies a set of fundamental variables for economic development. These variables are real and institutional alike. The nation's increased savings and investment capacities; the means by which it incorporates technical progress into production; human capital development; increased social cohesiveness, resulting in 2
The guarantee of property rights and contracts is naturally important but difficult to assure in the initial phase of economic development. On the other hand, entrepreneurs are risk-taking individuals or groups who are motivated by their inner need to achieve and by opportunities for profit (Bresser-Pereira, 2009b: ch. 2).
social capital or in a stronger, more democratic nation; a macroeconomic policy capable of ensuring the state's and the nation-state's financial health, leading to moderate domestic and foreign debt ratios -these are all constituents of a national development strategy. In this process, institutions, instead of being mere one-size-fits-all abstractions, are seen and construed concretely, historically. A national development strategy will gain meaning and strength when its institutions -be they short-term (public policies) or relatively permanent (laws, institutions proper) -respond to societal needs, when they are compatible with the economy's factor endowment, or, more broadly, when they are consistent with the elements that make up the structure of society.
All countries, beginning with England, required a national development strategy to bring about their industrial revolutions and to continue to develop. The use of a national development strategy was particularly evident among late-developing countries such as Germany and Japan, which were never characterized by dependence. Peripheral countries, on the other hand, like Brazil and other Latin American countries that had lived through the colonial experience, remained ideologically dependent on the center after achieving their formal independence. Both late-developing central countries and former colonies needed to formulate national development strategies, but the task was easier for the former. For peripheral countries, there was the additional hurdle of facing their own "dependency", that is, the subordination of local elites to central countries' elites. The structuralist social scientists who participated in national developmentalism in Latin America did not ignore this phenomenon, but assumed that economic development was characterized by a division between the progressive or nationalist elite associated with industrialization, and the conservative elite associated with the primary exports model that prevailed before 1930. They were nationalists because they acknowledged the existence of economic imperialism characterized by pressures from rich countries to prevent the industrialization of developing countries, or, once industrialization had become a fait accompli, to capture domestic markets for their multinational manufacturing enterprises by means of financial exploitation and unequal exchange in international markets. Besides, their nationalism was the ideology for strengthening state capacity and forming genuinely autonomous national states; it was the affirmation that, in order to develop, countries needed to define their own policies and institutions, their own national development strategies.
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National developmentalism and structuralism
Between the 1930s and the 1970s, Brazil and other Latin American countries grew at an extraordinary pace. They took advantage of the weakness of the center in the 1930s in order to formulate national development strategies that, in essence, implied protection of the infant national industry (or import-substitution industrialization) and the promotion of forced savings by the state. Additionally, the state was supposed to make direct investments in infrastructure and in certain basic industries whose capital requirements and risks were large. This strategy was called "national developmentalism." Such a name was designed to emphasize that, first, the policy's basic objective was to promote economic development, and, second, in order for this to happen, the nation -that is, businessmen, the state bureaucracy, the middle classes, and the workers united in international competition -needed to define the means to reach this objective within the framework of the capitalist system, with the state as the principal instrument of collective Nationalism can also be defined, as did Ernest Gellner (1983) , as the ideology that attempts to endow every nation with a state. Although this is a good definition, it is applicable to central Europe rather than to Latin America. In Latin America, nations were not yet fully formed but nevertheless were endowed with states. The nations, however, were incomplete, and their regimes were semi-colonial; with independence, the main change was that the dominant power shifted from Spain or Portugal to England and other major central European countries.
which they were part) to form the Latin American structuralist school. 6 The central elements of structuralism were the critique of the law of comparative advantage in international trade, the dualist character of underdeveloped economies with unlimited supplies of labor, and the role of the state in producing forced savings and directly investing in key industries. National developmentalism was not an economic theory but a national development strategy based on the assumption that markets are effective in resource allocation in so far as they are combined with economic planning and the constitution of state-owned enterprises. It was a strategy sponsored in one way or another by industrialists, the public bureaucracies and urban workers. It faced intellectual opposition from neoclassical or monetarist economists and political opposition from the liberal middle classes and the old oligarchy whose interests were based on the export of primary goods.
The demise of national developmentalism
Although the demise of national developmentalism and its replacement by conventional orthodoxy would happen only in the late 1980s, its causes, and -more generally -the weakening of the Latin American nations (after the relative strengthening associated with nationalism and industrialization) originated in the mid-1960s in the aftermath of the first major crisis to affect the region since 1930. The following historical factors contributed to this outcome: (a) the exhaustion of the import-substitution strategy; (b) the dominance of the associated-dependency interpretation of Latin America in the early 1970s; (c) the major foreign debt crisis of the 1980s, which weakened Latin American countries; (d) the neoliberal wave and, in the academic world, the rise of neoclassical economics, public choice theory, and new institutionalism -three sophisticated attempts to ground besides being perverse, carries the seeds of the dissolution of the national pro-development alliance. In sum, as old developmentalism was an inward-oriented strategy, it was time to replace it.
The dependency interpretation was the second reason for the final demise of old developmentalism in so far as it contributed to the weakening of economic nationalism in Latin America. A nation is a society of individuals sharing a common political destiny that has or expects to have a territory on which to build a state and form a nation-state. Nationstates or sovereign countries or just states (in the plural) are the political-territorial units that emerge from capitalist revolutions to replace old empires or other forms of traditional political society. A nation is always nationalist in as much as nationalism is the ideology of the formation of the nation-state and of its permanent reaffirmation. Yet a nation-state may formally exist in the absence of a true nation, as happened in the Latin American 9 countries, which, in the early 19th century, were endowed with nation-states due not only to the patriotic efforts of nationalist groups but also to the good services of Britain, whose aim was to oust Spain and Portugal from the region. In this way, and very differently from the United States, these countries were born dependent: they were endowed with statesconstitutional-legal systems and the apparatus that guarantees them -without having strong nations to sustain them. For a true nation to exist, the political center must be effectively national, and the social classes must, despite their mutual conflicts, cooperate when it comes to competing internationally. The 1930s were a turning point in Latin
America, because in this decade or around it many countries were able to internalize political decision-making instead of just accepting the policies originating in the rich countries; in other words, they were successful in neutralizing their dependency and defining national development strategies. Yet in the 1960s the resulting state-led strategy faced its first major economic crisis at a moment that coincided with the 1959 Cuban revolution and the heightening of the Cold War between capitalism and communism.
While the economic crisis disrupted the national economies, the Cuban revolution America (1969 America ( [1979 ), who also criticized the nationaldevelopmentalist strategy and the structuralist claim that underdevelopment was defined by dualism -by the coexistence and conflict between a coalition of patriarchal landowners and merchant capitalists on the one hand and a coalition of industrialists and public bureaucrats on the other, the former adopting a colonialist or dependent ideology, the latter a nationalist one. Instead, both interpretations adopted an anti-nationalist stand, fully rejecting the possibility of the existence of a national bourgeoisie in the region, despite historical evidence in contrary. Since this impossibility made the existence of true nations unviable, the overexploitation interpretation coherently -but with no basis on realityproposed the socialist revolution; less coherently, the associated dependency interpretation Of these three versions of the dependency interpretation, the dominant one since the 1970s has been the associated dependency interpretation. As in the authoritarian regimes, national developmentalism and state-led growth remained dominant in Latin America up to the 1980s; the democratic opposition tended to identify with this version rather than with the overexploitation version, which was too radical, or with the national-dependent version, whose nationalism could be confused with that of the authoritarian regimes.
Eventually, associated dependency contributed to re-democratization and the ensuing struggle to reduce inequality in the region, but it weakened the idea of the nation in each country, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s it was instrumental in the abandonment of a national development strategy in the Latin American countries and in their subordination to the Washington Consensus.
The third reason for the demise of national developmentalism was the great debt crisis of the 1980s. This crisis, whose consequences were disastrous for Latin America, was not directly related to the import-substitution model, but was an outcome of the strategy of growth-cum-foreign savings that rich countries proposed and development economics as well as Latin American structuralism was unable to criticize. Yet it further weakened the national alliance that was behind national developmentalism. The debt crisis paved the way for the high inflation that, in the countries in which the indexation of inflation was adopted, became inertial and proved highly persistent (Pazos 1972; Bresser-Pereira and Nakano 1984) . This high inflation was a factor for the transition to democracy in Brazil and Argentina, but, in so far as the developmentalist administrations in these two countries did not realize that old developmentalism was finished and adopted populist policies to confront the foreign debt crisis and to control inflation, they failed, which further contributed to the demise of national developmentalism, now identified with economic populism.
Economic populism is the irresponsible practice of an administration of systematically spending more money than it receives. Economic populism originated not only in budget deficits (fiscal populism); exchange rate populism (when an appreciating exchange causes real wages to artificially increase) was originally identified in the 1970s by Adolfo Canitrot (1975) . In the case This fifth and final reason for the demise of developmentalism and its replacement by conventional orthodoxy is related with the neoliberal hegemony that, in the early 1990s, of fiscal populism, the state spends more than it receives and incurs recurrent public deficits; in the case of exchange rate populism, the nation-state spends more than it receives and incurs recurrent current account deficits. A balance-of-payments crisis is usually the outcome, as Jeffrey Sachs (1990) demonstrated by analyzing and modeling populist episodes.
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The reaction to the "Chicago boys" who were behind the 1981 financial crisis is well known.
The authoritarian Chilean regime of Pinochet was successful only after the monetarist experiment was abandoned and a conservative politician, Hernán Büchi, abandoned neoclassical or monetarist principles and adopted much less orthodox policies, principally in relation to the exchange rate, whose overvaluation had been disastrous for the monetarist experiment. 
Conventional orthodoxy
To replace developmentalism, Washington proposed a "consensus" formed from a cluster of orthodox macroeconomic policies and market-oriented institutional reforms including (not originally but since the early 1990s) the most debatable policy of all: financial liberalization. It further proposed that developing countries abandon the antiquated concept of "nation" and accept the globalist thesis according to which, in the age of globalization, nation-states had lost autonomy and relevance: worldwide free markets (including financial ones) would take care of promoting economic development for all, provided that property rights and contracts were assured by the state.
The failure of conventional orthodoxy to promote Latin America's economic development is today widely acknowledged. It may be checked in Table 1 What is conventional orthodoxy? It is an ideology exported to developing countries that, despite its promise of promoting general prosperity, in fact serves rich nations' interests in neutralizing these middle-income countries' ability to compete. It may be summarily defined by four propositions: first, middle-income countries' major problem is the lack of microeconomic reforms capable of enabling the market to operate freely; second, controlling inflation is the main purpose of macroeconomic policy, even if inflation rates are moderate; third, in order to achieve such control, interest rates must inevitably be high, and the exchange rate correspondingly appreciated; fourth, economic development is a competition among countries to obtain foreign savings (current account deficits), and, so, the foreign exchange appreciation caused by capital inflows required to finance the deficits is no cause for concern because the returns on the increased investment rate pay for it. The disastrous effects of this discourse, which proved in practice to be wrong in terms of balance-of-payments crises and low growth in Latin American countries that adopted it after the late 1980s, are well known today.
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At the level of macroeconomic policies, conventional orthodoxy failed because it was associated with high rates of interest and the cyclical overvaluation of national currencies.
While national developmentalism intuitively acknowledged the existence of a structural tendency of the exchange rate to overappreciation, and worked to neutralize it, conventional orthodoxy ignored this tendency, secured capital account liberalization,
proposed the growth with foreign savings policy and led countries into balance-ofpayments crises. While Latin American countries lost control over their exchange rates, Asian countries achieved current account surpluses and retained control over their foreign exchange rates (the four countries that experienced the 1997 Asian crisis were those that for a moment relaxed their foreign exchange controls). At the reform level, Latin
American countries indiscriminately accepted all liberalizing reforms, irresponsibly privatizing public services monopolies, while the Asians were more prudent. In sum, by bowing to the Washington Consensus, Latin American countries interrupted their national revolutions, their nations became disorganized, lost cohesiveness and autonomy, and lost the ability to sustain a national development strategy.
New developmentalism
Yet the era of the long-run hegemony of one country over others is at an end. Thus, it is not surprising that, when it became manifest that the Washington Consensus was not causing growth but rather financial instability and increasing inequality, a reaction took By "rentier class" we no longer mean the class of large landowners but that of inactive capitalists whose livelihood is derived mainly from interest income. The "financial industry," in turn, involves, besides rentiers, businessmen and managers who collect commissions from rentiers.
14 In Brazil, the Workers Party (PT) adopted such a discourse, but once it had gained power in 2003 it adopted more sensible policies.
workers, government officials and middle-class professionals -a national agreement, therefore -is gradually being formed. This agreement regards globalization as neither a blessing nor a curse, but as a system of intense competition among national states through their firms. It realizes that, in such a competition, the state must be strengthened fiscally, administratively and politically, and, at the same time, must provide national firms with the conditions to become internationally competitive. It acknowledges, as Argentina did after its 2001 crisis, and as Brazil has begun to do since the start of the second Lula administration in 2007, that exceedingly high short-term interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate are major obstacles to growth.
New developmentalism starts from the theoretical assumption that developing countries face two structural tendencies that must be checked by economic policy if these countries are to grow fast and catch up: the tendency to the overvaluation of the exchange rate and the tendency of wages to increase more slowly than productivity. The former derives from the definition of a developing country as a dual economy and from the classic work of Arthur Lewis (1954) showing that developing countries face an unlimited supply of labor.
This fact implies a rise in wages when the worker migrates from the traditional sector to the modern sector, but thereafter it suppresses wages in the modern sector -which causes increasing inequality and a chronic insufficiency of demand. The second problem may be "solved" either by the production of luxury goods that the middle class and the rich consume, or by exporting wage goods and importing luxury goods and capital goods, as happened in Latin America in the 1970s. An equally perverse alternative is to create facilities for poor families contracting debt.
The second structural tendency -the tendency to the overvaluation of the exchange ratederives from the "Dutch disease" that drives down (appreciates) the exchange rate from the "industrial equilibrium" to the "current account equilibrium", and from the higher profit and interest rates prevailing in developing countries, which attract foreign capitals and appreciate the exchange rate below the current account equilibrium and cause current account deficits. This second factor, however, would not be sufficient to cause balance-ofpayments crises if it were not amplified by economic policies inspired by conventional orthodoxy (growth with foreign savings policy, use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, capital deepening policy) and also by development economics (solving the two- can expect some generosity -but even these must be wary, because the treatment the rich nations and the World Bank afford them and the help, or alleged help, they receive are often perverse.
At the national level, manufacturing industry has ceased to be infant, requiring generalized protection; it is now mature. Between the 1930s and the 1950s, the import-substitution model was effective in establishing the industrial bases of Latin American countries. After the mid-1960s, however, governments should have begun dropping some of their tax barriers to imports and adopting an export-led model combined with the development of the domestic market. Some countries, principally Brazil and Mexico, did orient their exports to manufacturing, but retained high import taxes. It was only in the early 1990s that trade liberalization took place, in the middle of a major economic crisis, and often hurriedly and haphazardly. Yet it is important to note that in countries like Brazil and
Argentina a large proportion of the import taxes was intended, not as a response to the infant industry problem, but as a way of neutralizing, on the import side, the Dutch disease caused by the highly favorable natural conditions that these countries offer for cattle 15 The two gap model asserted that besides the savings constraint, developing countries face a foreign currencies constraint, thus needing loans or investments from rich countries. breeding and agricultural exports. This 20-year lag was one of the distortions endured by national developmentalism of the 1950s.
New developmentalism is not protectionist: it simply emphasizes the need for a competitive exchange rate. It assumes that middle-income countries have already passed through the infant-industry stage but still face the Dutch disease: the fact that countries producing goods that use cheap natural resources experience the long-term appreciation of their exchange rate that is consistent with equilibrium in the the current account balance, but renders economically not viable other tradable industries using technology in the state of the art. Thus, the country is impeded of transferring labor from the production of lower to higher per capita valued-added goods -a key condition for economic growth. This transfer requires not protection, but management of the exchange rate to neutralize the market failure that the Dutch disease represents, thus supporting potentially viable industries with high knowledge content that adopt state-of-the-art technology. 17 Unlike old developmentalism, which embraced the export pessimism of development economics, new developmentalism lays odds on developing countries' ability to export medium valueadded manufactured goods or high value-added primary products. The experience of the past 30 years has clearly shown that export pessimism was one of the great theoretical mistakes of development economics. In the late 1960s, Latin American countries should have begun shifting decisively from the import-substitution model to the export-led model, as did Korea and Taiwan. In Latin America, Chile was the first to effect such a change and, as a result, its development is often pointed to as an example of a successful neoliberal strategy. In fact, neoliberalism was fully practiced in Chile only between 1973 and 1981, coming to an end with a major balance-of-payments crisis in 1982. 18 The exportled model is not specifically neoliberal if it is combined with an expanding domestic market. The fast-growing Asian countries originally adopted an import-substitution
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Since the Dutch disease is defined, and its gravity measured, by the difference between the "current exchange rate equilibrium" (which intertemporally balances the current account) and the "industrial exchange rate equilibrium" (which makes viable tradable industries without any protection), one way of partially neutralizing it is by imposing tariffs on imports. The more complete way is by levying a tax on sales of the commodity in which the disease originates strategy, but soon changed to an export-led model, which has two main advantages over the import-substitution model. First, the market available to industries is not limited to the domestic market. This is important for small countries but equally fundamental to a country with a relatively large domestic market, such as Brazil. Second, if a country adopts this strategy, the economic authorities, by framing an industrial policy to benefit their national firms, automatically establish an efficiency criterion to guide them: only firms that are efficient enough to export will benefit from the industrial policy. In the case of the import-substitution model, very inefficient firms may be enjoying the benefits of protection; in the case of the export-led model, the likelihood of this happening is substantially smaller.
Chart 1: Old and new developmentalism
Old developmentalism New developmentalism 1. Industrialization is based on import substitution.
1. Export-led growth combined with strong domestic market.
2. Leading role for the state in obtaining forced savings and in making investments.
2. The state is supposed to create investment opportunities and reduce economic inequalities.
3. Industrial policy is central. 3. Industrial policy is subsidiary.
4. Mixed attitude in relation to budget deficits.
Rejection of fiscal deficits.
5. Relative complacency towards inflation.
No complacency towards inflation.
A second difference between old developmentalism and new developmentalism concerns the role of the state. Under national developmentalism, countries were poor, and the state was supposed to play a leading role in achieving forced savings and in investing not only in monopolistic industries but also in industries characterized by large economies of scale and, so, requiring huge sums of capital. Fifty years later, most of the Latin American nation-states are middle-income countries; they have already completed or are involved in their own capitalist revolutions; they are equipped with a stock of capital that did not exist before, able to finance investment; they are equipped with entrepreneurial, professional and working classes able to industrialize and modernize their countries. The state continues to play a key role, but a normative, enabling and encouraging role rather than a direct role in production. In sum, and, again, because middle-income countries are at a different stage, new developmentalism is more favorable to the market as an efficient institution capable of coordinating the economic system than was old developmentalism, although its perspective is far removed from the irrational faith in the market evinced by conventional orthodoxy.
New developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy
In this paper I am sponsoring new developmentalism, but conventional orthodoxy is not dead. To the contrary, it is still dominant, principally in defining macroeconomic policy in Latin America. Let us now examine the differences between these two competing strategies, quite apart from the fact that one is imported while the other is national.
Conventional economic orthodoxy is made up of the set of theories, diagnoses and policy proposals that rich nations offer to developing countries. It is based on neoclassical economics but is not to be confused with it, because it is not theoretical but openly Consensus is, in fact, the effective shape that neoliberal and globalist ideology has assumed at the level of the economic policies recommended to developing countries.
In previous studies I distinguished between the First and the Second Washington Consensus, to highlight the fact that the former was concerned mostly with the macroeconomic adjustment that became necessary as a result of the great debt crisis of the 1980s and with trade liberalization and privatization, while the latter, prevalent since the 1990s, also seeks to operate as a development strategy based on an open capital account (which Williamson explicitly excluded from the first Washington Consensus) and on growth with foreign savings. Together, however, they form a single consensus -that of rich nations in relation to their competitors, the middle-income countries. Although the term "Washington Consensus" is useful, I prefer "conventional orthodoxy" because it is more generic and portrays "orthodoxy" as merely conventional knowledge. 20 Conventional orthodoxy is the means by which the United States, at the level of economic policies and institutions, expresses its ideological hegemony over the rest of the world and mainly over dependent developing countries that lack nations strong enough to challenge this hegemony, as has traditionally been the case with Latin American countries. This hegemony purports to be "benevolent," while, in fact, it is the arm and mouth of neoimperialism -that is, imperialism without formal colonies that characterizes the relation of rich countries with the dependent countries that are formally independent.
In as much as conventional orthodoxy is the practical expression of neoliberal ideology, it is the ideology of the market versus the state. While new developmentalism wants a strong state and a strong market, and sees no contradiction between them, conventional orthodoxy wishes to strengthen the market by weakening the state, as if the two institutions were parties in a zero-sum game. Since the second half of the 20th century, therefore, conventional orthodoxy has been a version of the laissez-faire ideology that prevailed in the previous century. Regardless of the fact that the state has grown in terms of tax load and of the level of market regulation as a result of the increased dimensions and complexity of modern societies, and of the fact that a strong and relatively large state is a requirement for a strong and competitive market, conventional orthodoxy is the practical reaction against the growth of the state's apparatus. Certainly, the state has also grown as a result of mere clientelism, to create jobs and employ the bureaucracy, but conventional orthodoxy is not interested in distinguishing legitimate state growth from the illegitimate variety. It is the ideology of the minimal state, of the laissez faire state, of the state that is concerned only with domestic and foreign security, leaving economic coordination, infrastructure investments, and even social services like health and education to the devices of the market. It is the individualistic ideology that assumes that all are equally capable of defending their interests. It is, therefore, a right-wing ideology, an 20 I have no sympathy with any orthodoxy whatsoever, since orthodoxies are a way of renouncing thinking, and none for unorthodoxy, where the economist, upon identifying himself as unorthodox, renounces the implementation of his ideas and policies and reserves for himself the role of eternal minority opposition. A good economist is neither orthodox nor unorthodox but pragmatic: he can make good economic policy based on an open, modest theory that forces him to constantly consider and decide under conditions of uncertainty.
ideology of the powerful, the rich, the better educated -the haute bourgeoisie and the high techno-bureaucracy. Its goal is to drive down direct and indirect real wages by leaving labor unprotected, thus making firms more competitive in an international market of developing countries and cheap labor.
The central difference between conventional orthodoxy and new developmentalism lies in the fact that conventional orthodoxy is market fundamentalist, believing that the market is an institution that coordinates everything optimally if it is free of interference, whereas new developmentalism is pragmatic. New developmentalism views the market as an efficient institution to coordinate economic systems, but knows its limitations. Factor allocation is the task that it performs best, but even here it faces problems. In stimulating investment and innovation, it is insufficient. It fails to neutralize two structural tendencies in developing countries: the tendency of the exchange rate to overappreciation and the tendency of wages to increase more slowly than productivity. And markets are a clearly unsatisfactory mechanism not only in distributing income but also because they favor the stronger and the more capable participants. While conventional orthodoxy acknowledges market failures but asserts that state failures are worse, new developmentalism rejects such pessimism about the possibilities of collective action and demands a capable state -not as compensation for a weak market but combined with a strong market. If human beings are able to build institutions to regulate human actions, including the market itself, there is no reason why they should not be able to strengthen the state organization or apparatus (making its administration more legitimate, its finances more solid, and its management more efficient) or to strengthen the constitutional or legal system (increasingly adjusting its institutions to social needs). Politics and democracy exist precisely for that purpose;
and the more advanced democracies have been making major advances in this area in the last century.
In so far as one of the foundations of new developmentalism is classical political economy, which was essentially a theory of the "wealth of nations" (Smith) and of capital accumulation (Marx), social structures and institutions are fundamental to its reasoning.
Besides, as it adopts a historical approach to economic development, the teachings of the German Historical School and of the American institutionalists are an essential part of its vision. 21 Thus, institutions are fundamental, and to reform them is a permanent requirement in so far as, in the complex and dynamic societies in which we live, economic activities must be constantly re-regulated. In contrast, conventional orthodoxy, based on neoclassical economics, only recently acknowledged the role of institutions, in the context of "new institutionalism." In contrast to historical institutionalism, which in relation to economic development sees obstacles to economic growth in precapitalist institutions and in the distortions of capitalist institutions, and actively seeks to develop a set or cluster of institutions (a national growth strategy), new institutionalism offers a simplistic answer to the problem: it is sufficient that institutions guarantee property rights and contracts, or, more broadly, the good working of markets, which will automatically promote growth.
According to the neoliberal jargon adopted, for instance, by The Economist, a good government will be a "reformist" one, involved in market-oriented reforms. According to new developmentalism, a government will be good in economic terms if it is able to promote economic growth and a more equal distribution of income by the adoption of economic policies and institutional reforms that are oriented, whenever possible, to the market, but often correcting it -in other words, if the country grows within the framework of a national development strategy. According to conventional orthodoxy, institutions should limit themselves almost exclusively to constitutional norms; according to new developmentalism, economic policies, and particularly monetary policies, must undergo permanent reform, a continual and gradual adjustment within the framework of a broader growth strategy. Industrial policy is required, but for new developmentalism a moderate interest rate and a competitive exchange rate are more important than an industrial policy. In comparing new developmentalism and conventional orthodoxy, we can distinguish growth strategies from macroeconomic policies, although the two are closely correlated.
Since growth is impossible without stability, let us begin by comparing macroeconomic policies. Since in references to "new developmentalism" we are thinking of middleincome countries, the macroeconomic policies that are required are not essentially different from those adopted in rich countries: they are based on fiscal balance, moderate interest rates and competitive exchange rates, which are common among rich countries.
Yet, since conventional orthodoxy observes the principle "do as I say, not as I do", it differs significantly from new developmentalism. As we can see in Chart 2, both value macroeconomic stability; but, while conventional orthodoxy reduces macroeconomic stability to price stability and control of public debt, new developmentalism requires a moderate interest rate and a competitive exchange rate that guarantee the intertemporal equilibrium of both the public account (of the state) and the foreign account (of the nationstate). Conventional orthodoxy's approach may be summed up as follows: In order to guarantee macroeconomic stability, a country should achieve a primary surplus that keeps the public debt-GDP ratio at an acceptable level for creditors. The central bank is supposed to have a single mandate, namely, to control inflation, since it has at its disposal a single instrument, namely, the short-term or basic interest rate. This rate is essentially endogenous, corresponding to the equilibrium or non-accelerating-inflation rate of interest, and, given fiscal imbalance, it should be high. The exchange rate is also endogenous, that is, it is market-defined, and its equilibrium will be automatically ensured by the market once a floating exchange rate is adopted.
New developmentalism takes a substantially different, Keynesian approach: Fiscal adjustment should not have as a parameter primary surplus but the budget deficit and, more than that, positive public saving that finances the required public investments without public indebtedness. The central bank, in association with the finance ministry,
should not be limited to a single mandate but should have a triple one: to control inflation, to keep the exchange rate competitive (compatible with the current account balance and the gradual transfer of manpower to more knowledge-intensive or high per capita valueadded industries -something that a recurrent Dutch disease prevents) and to achieve reasonably full employment. In order to perform these tasks, the central bank does not have at its disposal a single instrument (as neoclassical macroeconomics asserts) but several instruments besides the interest rate: it may buy reserves and establish capital inflow controls to avoid the tendency of the exchange rate to relative appreciation that is common among middle-income countries. The interest rate is an instrument to control inflation, but its average level may be considerably lower than conventional orthodoxy assumes for developing countries; the exchange rate should be kept floating, but managed -there is no such thing as a completely free exchange rate.
Chart 2: Macroeconomic policies compared
Conventional orthodoxy New developmentalism 1. The primary surplus is the central fiscal standard.
1. The budget deficit and public savings are the central fiscal standards. 2. The central bank has a single mandated target:
inflation.
2. The central bank has three mandated targets: inflation, exchange rate, and employment. 3. The central bank uses a single instrument: the short-term interest rate.
3. The central bank may also buy reserves or impose controls on capital inflow to manage the exchange rate. 4. The short-term interest rate is endogenous and should be high.
4. The short-term interest rate is exogenous and can be moderate. 5. The exchange rate is floating and endogenous.
5. The exchange rate is floating but administered.
Let us now compare the growth strategies that I present in Chart 3. Conventional orthodoxy supports institutional reforms that reduce the size of the state and strengthen the market. It ascribes a minimal role to the state in investment and industrial policy, and it does not envisage any role for the nation (an absent concept). It proposes the opening of the capital account and a growth-cum-foreign-savings policy.
In contrast, new developmentalism wants institutional reforms that strengthen the state as well as the market -only a capable state organization and state normative institutions endowed with legitimacy can serve as instruments of the nation's collective action. New developmentalism sees the nation as a national society with a sense of common destiny and of solidarity when competing internationally, as the fundamental actor defining a national growth strategy. It views as the fundamental institution for this growth the national development strategy, which creates incentives for entrepreneurs to innovate and invest. It gives priority to export industries and to industries characterized by high per capita value-added, that is, industries with a high technological or knowledge content. It believes that it is not only necessary but possible to increase domestic saving, for all developed countries did so in the past. The Dutch disease, the growth-cum-foreign-savings policy recommended by conventional orthodoxy, is a major cause of exchange-rate appreciation -appreciation that must always be prevented, since a competitive exchange rate, relatively depreciated, is the central condition for growth.
Before the 1990s, conventional orthodoxy was concerned with foreign exchange rates and, during balance-of-payments crises, always demanded foreign-exchange depreciations in addition to fiscal adjustments. Since the 1990s, however, the IMF has practically forgotten current account deficits (they were foreign savings, after all) and exchange rate depreciations. The twin-deficit hypothesis exempted it from worrying about current account deficits: all it had to do was concern itself with the primary surplus. For a while, it chose to talk about foreign exchange-rate anchors and dollarization; after that strategy failed in Mexico, Brazil and, above all, Argentina, the IMF turned to fully floating exchange rates to solve all external problems.
New developmentalism is strongly critical of this perspective and wants control not only over the state's public accounts (public deficit) but also over the nation's total accounts (current account). It wants not only the state's debt to be low but also the state to show positive public savings. It also wants a nation-state to have foreign accounts that ensure its national security and autonomy. It wants not only interest rate management but also foreign exchange-rate management, even if it's within the framework of a floating rate regime -which it does not call "dirty," as conventional orthodoxy is wont to do, but Each of the above points is deserving of a lengthy analysis, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. In both comparative charts, my objective was to show that, contrary to the hegemonic ideology that assumes that conventional orthodoxy is the "golden straightjacket" for all countries proposed by ideologues of neoliberalism, there is a viable and responsible alternative. The experience of East Asian countries that never accepted conventional orthodoxy was already clear on the existence of this alternative; it has become even clearer with the recent experience of Russia and Argentina. In the 1990s, these two countries adopted conventional-orthodoxy models and then fell into deep crisis;
after rejecting this economic model in the 2000s, the two countries are now performing in high-growth mode. Thus, new developmentalism is not a theoretical proposal but expresses successful national experiences. And conventional orthodoxy is neither a growth strategy nor a derivation from sound development macroeconomics; it is stagnation macroeconomics.
The policies derived from sound development macroeconomics must be oriented to responsible fiscal practices, a moderate average interest rate and a competitive exchange rate; this is the policy tripod of new developmentalism. When macroeconomists in rich countries discuss monetary and fiscal policies in their own countries they do disagree, but they agree on the three above points. The conventional orthodoxy that is applied in developing countries, however, shows a quite different practice. Although it is always asking for fiscal discipline, it is soft on this matter; Brazil, for instance, has achieved the fiscal target defined by conventional orthodoxy in each of the last eight years, 22 but fiscal problems have not been overcome. Conventional orthodoxy shows no discomfort in asserting that Brazil's real equilibrium interest rate is 9 percent a year and in defending the central bank's interest rate policy that has averaged 12 percent in real terms in recent years -a short-term interest rate that, in the special case of Brazil, directly aggravates the public debt. 23 And conventional orthodoxy insists, against the evidence, that it is impossible to manage the long-term exchange rate; this may be true for the United States, where the dollar is the international reserve currency, but it is not true for other countries.
Of these three policies, the crucial one is the requirement of a competitive exchange rate.
By "competitive" I understand the exchange rate that besides equilibrating intertemporally the current account ensures international competitiveness for tradable industries if they adopt state-of-the-art technologies. The currencies of developing countries face a tendency to relative overvaluation, for several reasons: In the case of a growth-cum-foreign-savings policy, the overvaluation implies a current account imbalance; in the case of the Dutch disease, a relatively overvalued currency that makes economic development just not possible is consistent with current account equilibrium. There is nothing more disagreeable to conventional orthodoxy than the exchange rate topic. For years, development economists did not discuss the exchange rate -that was the concern of macroeconomics. A competent development macroeconomics and, in strategic terms, new developmentalism are correcting the course and showing how central the exchange rate is not only to keeping the current account balanced but also to promoting savings and investment.
22
Between 1999 and 2002, the primary surplus target defined by the IMF was 3.5% of GDP; thereafter, the target was increased to 4.25%.
23
In Brazil, there is no difference between the short-term and the long-term interest rates, since it is the short-term interest rate set by the Central Bank that defines the interest paid on Brazilian domestic treasury bonds. This is an absurd financial institution -an inheritance from the times of high inertial inflation that is carefully preserved by the representatives of conventional orthodoxy.
Finally, since developing countries are dualistic countries that face the problem of an unlimited supply of labor, there is the tendency of wages to increase more slowly than productivity. Thus, there is a tendency to the concentration of income that must be checked by economic policy -particularly by a minimum wages policy and a large program of social expenditures in education, health care, social assistance and social security -not only for distributive reasons, but also because inequality is a source of political instability that is eventually a major obstacle to growth (Przeworski and Curvale 2006) .
Conclusion
What are the results of the two approaches? The outcome of conventional orthodoxy in Latin America is well known: quasi-stagnation. Since 1990, at least, the truth from Washington and New York became hegemonic in this region marked by dependence.
Reforms and adjustments of all sorts took place, but no development ensued. The results of new developmentalism in Latin America, in turn, cannot be measured. Chile has used it, but it is a small country, and its policies are halfway between one strategy and the other.
The Argentina of Kirschner and former Finance Minister Roberto Lavagna is the only concrete experiment, but this is much too recent to enable an objective appraisal. Still, new developmentalism is more than proven, because it is none other than the strategy that Asia's dynamic countries have been using.
Can new developmentalism become hegemonic in Latin America, as developmentalism was in the past? The failure of conventional orthodoxy assures me that, indeed, it can.
Argentina's 2001 crisis was a turning point: the requiem of conventional orthodoxy. No country was more faithful in the adoption of its prescriptions; no president was ever more dedicated to confidence-building than Carlos Menem. The results are common knowledge.
On the other hand, new developmentalist thinking is renewing itself. It has available a younger generation of development macroeconomists who are able to think on their own account instead of just accepting the recommendations of the international financial institutions. There is, however, an issue of ideological hegemony to resolve. Latin American countries will resume sustained development only if their economists, businessmen and state bureaucrats recall the successful experience that old developmentalism was, and reveal themselves capable of taking a step forward. They have already criticized the former mistakes and realized the new historical facts that affect them. They must now acknowledge that the national revolution that was under way, with the old developmentalism as the national strategy, was interrupted by the great crisis of the 1980s and by the neoliberal ideological wave from the North. They must perform an indepth diagnosis of the quasi-stagnation that conventional orthodoxy caused. They are supposed to consider that the key policies that need change are the macroeconomic ones, particularly those related to the interest rate and the exchange rate. They must turn an attentive eye toward the national development strategy of dynamic Asian countries. They must become involved in the great collective national work of rejecting the macroeconomics of stagnation that conventional orthodoxy implies, and of formulating a new national development strategy for their countries. I believe that this resumption of awareness is fully under way. Latin America's development has always been "nationaldependent," because its elites were always in conflict and ambiguous or ambivalent -now affirming themselves as a nation, now yielding to foreign ideological hegemony. There is, however, a cyclical element to this process (Bresser-Pereira 1993) . Since the early 2000s it has been becoming clear that the era of neoliberalism and of its proposed economic strategy, the Washington Consensus, is over; the present global financial crisis has put a definitive end to it. New perspectives are opening up for Latin America. In the framework of new developmentalism, each individual country now has the possibility of adopting effectively national development strategies -strategies that widen the role of the state in regulating and in stimulating private investment and innovation, strategies that increase the country's international competitiveness while protecting labor, the poor and the environment.
